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. Robinson LADB news analyst In 1989, Peruvian novelist Rodrigo Machado Gonzalez Prada
published his latest work, "Los potros de Atila: El golpe militar de 1992 en el Peru" (Attila's Colts:
the 1992 Coup in Peru). The novel portrays a military coup d'etat in 1992 resulting from the spread
of the Sendero Luminoso insurgency. Sendero is defeated at a cost of 600,000 lives, the elimination
of all democratic organizations, and a 25- year dictatorship. Although a work of fiction, the novel
has been seen in recent months by some Peru observers as a chilling example of "history foretold."
President Alberto Fujimori's April 5 "auto-golpe" in which he dissolved congress, shut down
much of the judicial system, and suspended the constitution was touched off by the inability of
the country's formal institutions to confront Sendero. In turn, the coup has paved the way for an
escalation of the armed conflict and an increase in military control and impunity. Despite fierce
opposition from the traditional political class, the media, and most of the international community,
Fujimori's coup enjoyed broad support among the Peruvian population, particularly in urban
areas. This support was in part due to widespread discontent with traditional politicians, fatigue
over the prolonged state of internal war and economic crisis, and a willingness to confront these
problems "by any means necessary." However, such support may prove short-lived, precisely
because the measures imposed through the coup are unlikely to resolve the national crisis in the
near future. In fact, since April 5, Sendero has launched an unprecedented series of bombings in
Lima, dramatically increasing the sense of insecurity. The coup played into Sendero's strategy of
provoking the collapse of formal democratic institutions and the disintegration of the state. Some
analysts are predicting that the "auto-golpe" stands to benefit Sendero for several related reasons.
First, it created an institutional power vacuum which could play into the hands of the rebels. Second,
to the extent that the coup's authoritarian measures further restrict the space for popular and
democratic organizations, it polarizes the country and leaves the population trapped between the
regime and the Sendero guerrillas. Finally, if the situation does not improve, Fujimori will expend
his credibility. Analysts predict that at that point, Sendero may come to be seen fatalistically as
the last alternative. Sendero's Roots The Communist Party of Peru, or Sendero Luminoso, is one
of the most violent, enigmatic, and fanatical guerrilla movements in the history of Latin America.
Since Sendero initiated its armed struggle in the southern Andean department of Ayacucho in
1980, the insurgency has spread throughout Peru and is now active in at least 21 of the country's 24
departments. Insistent denials from both the right and the left notwithstanding, Sendero poses a
serious challenge to the Peruvian state and is becoming a contender for power. Despite its nature
as an extremely violent and authoritarian organization, Sendero has been able to establish an
authentic base of both passive and active support in certain Andean zones, particularly Ayacucho
and neighboring Apurimac and Huancavelica departments. Yet Sendero has failed to achieve its
goal of building an active, mass following outside of its original base in the southern highlands.
The insurgents are widely despised in Lima, home to about half of the country's population, and
Sendero has alienated much of the population in the departments of the fertile central highlands.
In the northern highlands, Sendero has been able to consolidate a presence not through political
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 5

LADB Article Id: 060092
ISSN: 1060-4189

mobilization but by serving as intermediary between peasant coca farms and drug traffickers.
Even in the southern highlands, support for Sendero has diminished. However, in accordance
with Sendero's strategy, the insurgency does not need to garner nationwide support for a popular
insurrection. Instead, the rebels seek to undermine the authority of the Peruvian state and expedite
the collapse of its institutions. In Sendero's script, the insurgency's own parallel institutions and
power structures ("a new state in formation") will step into the void, in a fashion not unlike the rise
to power nearly two decades ago of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia. Sendero's relative success can
best be understood in the context of Peruvian history and the special circumstances prevalent in the
country when the movement first appeared in 1980. Perhaps more than any other Latin American
country, pre-1968 Peru, with its vicious seignorial system in the haciendas that dominated the
Andean highlands, was the epitome of a semi-feudal society that had changed little since the days
of Spanish colonialism. The "gamonalismo" system of power and oppression, based as much on
class as on the ethnic oppression of the indigenous majority, became the target of the reformistoriented military regime that ruled from 1968-1980. The military-sponsored agrarian reform, based
not on empowerment of campesino organizations but on authoritarian change instituted from
above, did away with much of the highland landowning class but left the merchants and other
local bosses untouched. With the partial elimination of the seignorial system, gamonalismo was
not so much liquidated as transformed. Specifically, the "bosses" merely changed from being
landlords to being merchants and bureaucrats. Campesino expectations remained unfulfilled
and dissatisfaction remained high. Moreover, the military regime, unlike other Latin American
reformist projects during this century, failed to establish viable political institutions or corporatist
structures that could channel grievances and co-opt unrest. By rupturing the political hegemony of
gamonalismo and modifying the traditional socioeconomic structures without establishing a viable
replacement, the military left a power vacuum in the countryside which Sendero was able to fill.
The southern highlands presented particularly propitious economic, political and social conditions
for Sendero. This region has historically been the most marginalized and impoverished in the
country. Before the military assumed power, agricultural incomes there were less than half those
in the northern and central highlands, and less than one-seventh of incomes in Lima. While the
military-sponsored agrarian reform was profound in some regions of the country, in Ayacucho just
over 10% of the rural population benefitted. During the 1970s, the southern highlands experienced
a socioeconomic decline both in absolute terms and relative to other regions. In sum, Sendero's
analysis in 1980 that conditions in the southern highlands were ripe for its "prolonged people's war"
was largely accurate. (For background analysis on the origins of Sendero in the southern highland,
see: Cynthia McClintock, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso Rebellion: Origins and Trajectory," in Power
and Social Protest: Latin American Social Movements, edited by Susan Echstein, University of
California Press, 1989; and "Fatal Attraction: Peru's Shining Path," NACLA Report on the Americas,
Dec./Jan 1990-91.) Sendero Ideology and Practice The conditions of the late 1970s and early 1980s
only partially explain Sendero's early success. The organization's nature, ideology, perseverance,
dedication, and long-term perspective sets Sendero apart from other Peruvian revolutionary groups.
Sendero practices an ideological rigidity and organic cohesiveness that gives it a certain advantage
in its efforts to impose its authority over local government structures and popular organizations
alike. The organization applies a "pure" and dogmatic Maoist analysis to Peru and the revolutionary
movement. (For an analysis of Sendero's Maoist ideology, see Colin Harding, "Antonio Diaz
Martinez and the Ideology of Sendero Luminoso," in Bulletin of Latin American Research, Vol 7,
No. 1, 1988.) Sendero labels every Peruvian government to date as "fascist and reactionary," and
considers the Peruvian countryside to still be predominantly "feudal." According to this analysis,
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Peru is ruled by an alliance of feudal landlords, a comprador bourgeoisie, and imperialism, which
represents the Peruvian equivalent of China's Kuomintang regime. In turn, Sendero has adopted
a Maoist strategy of working to consolidate peasant support in the countryside as the basis for an
assault on the cities. The proclamation by Sendero leader Abimael Guzman ("President Gonzalo")
of a "Republic of New Democracy" in Sendero-controlled zones is, in fact, directly borrowed from
Mao's description of zones in China under communist influence during the 1935-1949 period.
Violence is given central importance in Sendero's strategy. The heavy dose of compulsion and terror
brought to bear suggests that the authoritarian violence against the poor, their organizations and
leaders, is seen as a central feature of Sendero political-military action. What matters is not only
that adversaries be eliminated, but how the killing is done. The fury and brutality of Sendero armed
activities is striking. The ideology of violence might be as much a perverted reaction to five centuries
of deep-rooted injustice and the generalized and arbitrary violence of the semi-feudal system itself,
as it is a product of Sendero's cult-like Maoism. In any case, the extreme violence has undeniably
contributed to the insurgency's success. According to some analysts, the cruelty exhibited in
Sendero-sponsored killings shatters historic passivity and fatalism, awakening the hatred harbored
by the oppressed. By defying and undermining the supposed eternal stability of traditional highland
society, Sendero has managed to overturn the long-internalized conviction that the "gamonal"
and all associated with him are fundamentally superior beings. In this view, Sendero represents
a violent reaffirmation of the peasants' humanity, denied during five centuries of oppression.
Pervasive terror notwithstanding, violence is not the only relationship between Sendero and the
campesinos of the southern highlands. Sendero has, in fact, been able to guarantee peasants in the
areas under its hegemony certain previously unknown rights, such as personal security, the efficient
administration of justice and accountability of public officials. Peru is Not Ayacucho However,
Sendero's belief that success in the southern highlands would spread to the rest of the country has
proved an illusion. Peru is not Ayacucho. The serfdom and gamonalismo, as well as the particular
socioeconomic and political conditions that contributed to Sendero's success in Ayacucho did not
exist in the rest of the country. Facing an entirely different system of oppression, the campesinos
of the fertile highland valleys and the urban poor and working class sectors have a long history
of grassroots democratic organizing and struggle. It was the unprecedented mobilization of these
sectors between 1977-79 that created the democratic opening and brought down the military regime.
These sectors are ill-disposed towards Sendero's authoritarianism. Sendero launched its prolonged
people's war at a time when other groups on the left were concentrating on legal, parliamentary
activity, on the one hand, and work with popular organizations, such as industrial and peasant
unions, on the other. For Sendero, any group not under its control is considered "reactionary"
and counter-revolutionary. Thus, Sendero has turned to a policy of intimidation and the physical
elimination of the popular and democratic organizations and their leaders, including mine workers,
campesino leaders, and, more recently, community leaders in Lima itself. Dozens of leaders of
the United Left (Izquierda Unida-IU) coalition and hundreds of community leaders have been
gunned down by Sendero militants, often in brutal public slayings. In its attacks, Sendero displays
utter contempt for the poor and the organizations they have built, while ignoring the opinions and
initiatives of those they say are to be the beneficiaries of the insurgency. In 1988, Sendero shifted
the focus of its activities to the capital. In establishing an underground network in Lima, it focused
on newcomers from the highlands, where drought, low farm prices and violence created a massive
wave of migrants to the urban center during the 1980s. But Sendero has not been able to build a
mass base in Lima. Its actions are limited to car bombings, selective assassinations and other actions
which only require tightly controlled party cells. The Population: Sandwiched Between the Army
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and Sendero Meanwhile, the government's war against Sendero has become synonymous with
human rights violations and continued military impunity. About half of the approximately 30,000
people killed in political violence since 1980 died at the hands of the security forces. Peru leads Latin
America in the number of disappeared persons. Even before the April coup, over two-thirds of the
national territory was under virtual military rule. The army's strategy was described in 1982 in an
oft- quoted statement by army Gen. Luis Cisneros, following the declaration of a state of emergency
in three Andean departments: "In order for the security forces to be successful, they will have to
begin to kill Sendero rebels and non-rebels alike...They will kill 60 people and at best three will
be Sendero rebels, but they will say that all 60 were Sendero rebels." Late last year the Peruvian
congress vetoed special emergency legislation submitted by Fujimori that would have given the
military virtual independence in conducting the counterinsurgency war. Fujimori claimed the veto
was evidence of the inefficiency of the political system, and then proceeded to impose the legislation
in the form of unilateral presidential decrees. The resulting crisis between the executive and the
legislature was the prelude to the April coup. In early 1992, Sendero launched an urban offensive.
The offensive was escalated in the wake of the coup. Hundreds were killed or injured in a car bomb
campaign that began in June. The political message to Lima residents is that the streets, whether in
a shanty town or a middle-class shopping district, are no longer safe. "Security is now the number
one problem for everyone," said one grassroots organizer in Lima. Using the bombings as cover,
Sendero has stepped up its political work in Lima's poor neighborhoods. The current objective is to
gain control over community organizations and to recruit for Sendero's urban front. In Sendero's
analysis, the armed struggle is shifting to a new stage: "strategic parity" with the armed forces. With
the disruption of the traditional parties and the administrative vacuum following the coup, Sendero
sees new opportunities in Lima. The coup was carried out with the full backing of the military,
which won tremendous new institutional prerogative and influence. "The situation is more difficult
and complicated after the coup," said ret. Col. Jose Bailetti. "The armed forces are now politically
engaged, whether they like it or not." The army's "anti-subversive" campaign has intensified since
the coup, with indiscriminate attacks on the population and grassroots organizations. Thus the coup
has effectively reduced the space for popular sector organizing and strengthened both Sendero and
the military. Trapped between the army and Sendero are the grassroots democratic organizations of
the poor and popular sectors in the cities and the highland valleys. An army that acts with impunity,
notorious for its indiscriminate human rights violations, and which views popular organizing as
subversive, in many ways serves as a compliment to Sendero's strategy. As both sides lay siege to
Peru's democratic grassroots organizations, the nation is steadily being transformed into precisely
what Sendero claimed it was all along: a fascist dictatorship where all avenues for non-authoritarian,
revolutionary change are closed off. Meanwhile, the already depressed economy has taken a nosedive since the coup. Peru is referred to derisively as the "Bangladesh" of the Americas. Annual per
capita income in Peru is about US$1,000, but for the poor majority, the average is only about US$200.
The armed conflict has already led to about US$20 billion in economic damages. Public education
and the health care system are in shambles. Since 1985, over one million Peruvians have emigrated.
Sendero has also been able to expand its influence by taking advantage of a weak and fragmented
state which has been unable to develop an effective response to the insurgency and of the inability
of the political parties of the left, center or right to articulate a viable way out of the national crisis.
Sendero now hopes to extend its own military and political authority in direct proportion to the
crumbling of the social order through ungovernability, economic crisis, the militarization of political
power, extreme poverty and corruption. President Fujimori promised that "the country will achieve
peace by 1995." But that promise is seen with increasing skepticism. To the extent that the Fujimori
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regime is unable to make sufficient progress, poverty and misery will continue to breed discontent,
a key "ally" of Sendero. The population could soon be left with only two options for overcoming
chaos and ungovernability: Sendero or a full-blown military dictatorship. Gonzalez Prada's novel,
"Antilla's Colts," could turn into a veritable fiction-cum- reality.

-- End --
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